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ABSTRACT 
 
The labor wage is the result of market variables and institutional settings of a country. In an open 
economy the determination of the market wage rate may be further affected by the extent of 
international mobility of both factors of production, labor and capital. Labor mobility is represented 
by migration in and out of a country, while capital mobility relates mostly to the extent of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) outflows and inflows. Migrants may represent an addition to the native 
labor force of a country and, in some cases, play a substitute role with respect to incumbent 
workers. FDI, in particular of the greenfield category, represents either a supplement to or a 
reduction of the domestic capital and, by and large, changes the opportunity set of  a firm’s CEO 
with respect to the corresponding company operating in a closed economy. International factor 
mobility and domestic market variables, such as unemployment and productivity, interact in the 
wage setting process.  In this paper, we derive a theoretical wage equation following the above 
premises, and perform pooled mean group estimates of its parameters on panel data for a group of 
13 European countries with quarterly time observation over the period 1996-2007. We find that 
capital outflows  have a robust negative effect on the wage rate. The effects of migration inflows, 
on the other hand, are not so clear-cut, as they can be nullor negative depending on the sample of 
countries considered.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The problem 
 
The determination of the market labor wage in an open economy is affected by many variables. 
Some of them pertain to the very mechanics of the inner domestic markets and structure of a 
country. That is the case of unemployment, institutional settings, the diffusion and shape of the 
welfare state,  the dynamics of labor productivity, the extent of flexibility of the labor market. 
Other determinants are the aftermath of globalization of the economy and have an impact on 
salaries which depends by and large upon the intensity of international openness of an area in 
terms of both trade in goods and services and international mobility of production factors, i.e., 
labor and capital. While on the former set of variables we enjoy an abundant crop of theory and 
applied analyses, contributions on international factor mobility are more recent and display 
several controversial results, which leave wide room for research. Moreover, the majority of 
studies tends to be confined to the effect of international labor migration on wage levels in host 
countries and, to a lower extent, in sending areas. The investigation of the consequences of 
capital mobility on wages is less popular and is often neglected. Only in recent contributions 
international financial flows surface as a primary actor on the playground of labor markets 
equilibria. As a matter of fact the crossborder mobility of both factors of production is relevant 
and worth investigating in an age of growing delocalization of productive activities via foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and simultaneous migration flows of human beings. Indeed, the 
literature on migration mostly emphasizes labor immigration (entrance of foreign workers in a 
host country), while a lower attention has been paid to emigration (exodus of native workers 
from their own nation). In a general equilibrium of goods and factors international trade, labour 
mobility should produce compensating effects in the country of origin (wage increase) and of 
destination (wage decrease) and opposite movements in capital returns. However, the picture 
radically differs when market imperfections, different international mobility between capital and 
labour, large unemployment rates ( labour market disequilibria), barriers to trade of factors and 
goods  are taken into account. Turning to capital mobility, our attention is confined to FDI 
outflows from and inflows to a country. Other sorts of capital flows are thought to be non 
relevant as to their effects on wages. FDIs make (in particular greenfield FDIs, while brownfield 
FDIs are just acquisitions of existing companies by foreign buyers) either for an addition to 
existing domestic capital or for a potential subtraction from it. The FDI usually changes the 
opportunity set of firms’ CEOs since it allows an enterprise to choose between locations of 
production units in different countries. Therefore, before accepting a wage deal,  firms which 
have the opportunity to operate on a multinational scenario,  may consider the possibility of 
investing in a foreign country where wages may be lower. Of course this opportunity is not 
available for all firms in all countries. Multinationals, regardless of their size, may build new 
plants in foreign countries giving rise to an FDI either for the production of intermediate or final 
goods. In other words, the opportunities offered by international capital and production 
mobility, represented mostly by FDI, may make a firm less willing to accept a wage deal which 
could endanger its competitiveness vis à vis domestic and foreign rivals. The mirror image of 
this may be represented by workers willing to accept lower wage deals because of the dual 
threat of fellow migrants who enter the country willing to work for less and of the opportunity 
for firms to locate production elsewhere. The moral is that capital mobility may affect in a 
crucial way labour market equilibria and provide additional downward wage pressure besides 
that exerted, if any, by the import of foreign labor via migration.  
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Related literature 
 
In the last two decades, most of the rich and assorted literature4 on international factor mobility 
has been devoted to the investigation of the degree of substitutability between migrant and 
native labor. The focus has a political origin since trade unions and policy makers are quite keen 
about the wage and social effects of migration and their political consequences in terms of 
voting preferences. Policy makers oscillate between the Scilla of a thorough opening to migrants 
inflows pleasing entrepreneurs and the Cariddi of setting barriers limiting entrance of foreign 
workers to please trade unions. So do many papers moving between two different extremes, 
wondering whether migrants may represent an addition to the native labor force of a country or 
just play a substitute role. These two alternatives hide two different reactions of wages: no 
change in the first case, and a decrease in the second.  
The answers to this question are quite different, sometimes even in studies of the same scholars 
over time. For instance, if we confine to recent contributions, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) 
maintain that migration decreases the wage of low skilled while increases high skill wages. 
Later D’Amauri, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) explore the German labor market over the 1990’s 
and empirically adapt  a general equilibrium model. Migrants turn out not to be close substitutes 
for native workers but only for old migrants of similar education and skill. One year later, in an 
affine vein in a study on the U.S.:“If immigrants and natives in the same skill group are 
imperfect substitutes, the competitive effects of additional immigrant inflows are concentrated 
among immigrants themselves, lessening the impacts on natives” (Card, 2009, p. 2). In these 
contributions and in complementary researches (Ortega and Peri, 2009)  immigration simply 
seems to increase employment and growth with no significant effect on natives’ wages. In some 
sense we may say that migration occurs in a quasi - Rybczynski5 framework, where the increase 
in the endowment of a factor of production for a country with no dominant position on 
international markets leaves relative prices of factors and goods unaffected and boosts aggregate 
economic activity6. The inflow of migrants does seem to reduce neither capital intensity7, nor 
total factor productivity in the short-run or in the long run, nor average wages and average 
income per person. Further evidence of imperfect substitution between migrants and natives is 
provided in a detailed coverage of the UK in Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012).  
In most of these studies migration seems to exert its negative effect mainly on the wage  of 
incumbent immigrants while natives do not suffer in any discernable way. A distinct strand of 
literature claims nearly opposite results. In Borjas (2003) and in Aydemir and Borjas (2007) the 
pressure of migration on labor incomes is highly negative: “the wage impact of immigration 
depends on the elasticity of product demand, the rate at which the consumer base expands as 
immigrants enter the country, the elasticity of supply of capital, and the elasticity of substitution 
across inputs of production. The wage effect of immigration is negative if the impact of 
immigration on the potential size of the consumer base is smaller than its impact on the size of 
the workforce”(Borjas, 2009) which is what usually happens. In Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson 
(2011) the conclusion gets extreme: skilled immigrants and natives in the U.S. turn out to be 
                                               
4Two comprehensive works deserve mentioning. The first considers migration effects in a historical perspective (Hatton 
and Williamson, 2005). The second provides a survey of recent literature focusing on wage and assimilation effects of 
migration (Kerr and Kerr, 2011). 
 
5After the theorem of  Rybczynski (1955) 
6To be precise, migration, in such framework increases the production of the labor intensive industry while decreasing it 
in the capital intensive sector. 
7In a Rybczynski framework the inflow of labor does not alter the capital intensity of each industry, but the production 
of the labor intensive good increases, thus reducing the aggregate capital intensity. 
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perfect substitutes. Using Borjas (2009) dataset they obtain elasticities of substitution between 
natives and migrants which are much higher than those of Ottaviano and Peri (2006). In the 
same tune,  Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009)  had previously delved into the effects of 
migration from Eastern Europe to Britain since 2004, coming across an increased fear of 
unemployment and a significant downward pressure on salaries. Nonetheless, towards the end 
of the first decade of the new millennium more comprehensive and syncretic views appear. In 
Docquier, Özden and Peri (2010) emigration as well as immigration are explored in Europe over 
a long span of time. It appears that a drop in average wages is caused by emigration, while 
immigration has a positive influence on mean wages. This result is counterintuitive and is not 
consistent with non fixed price (non Rybczynski) factor trade theories where immigration 
should push down wages in host countries while emigration should have the opposite upshot in 
sending countries, as we mentioned in the first part of this introduction.   
As it can be seen, there are different, sometimes radically opposite, views about the overall 
influence of migrants on natives’ incomes. Nonetheless,  the indirect channel of influence 
through incumbent migrants seems to point to a definite substitutability between migrants and 
natives even after controlling for education and skill. Overall, the evidence is mixed, although 
there seems to be at least some agreement on the fact that migration touches on wages at least of 
incumbent foreign workers. 
Parallel to the investigation of market relationships between migrants and natives a second 
stream of contributions regards the issue of wage moderation in Western countries during the 
last two decades. According to many observers (Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso, 2008)  the 
temperance could be associated to the degree of international opening of labor, capital and 
goods markets.  Quite flat wage dynamics have been observed in the euro area after the 
introduction of the common currency which imposed to all member countries a fixed exchange 
rate on almost half of their trade flows8. This wage moderation has been interpreted by 
Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2008) as a sign of a flattening of the Phillips curve. This appears 
in particular  in Spain over the years 1995–2006 when unemployment falls while wage inflation 
is low and constant as a result of immigration. A similar theoretical conclusion appears in 
Binyamini and Razin (2008), where, in a New-Keynesian framework, international labor, goods 
and capital mobility weakens the Phillips curve trade-off.  
In the rare most comprehensive and general contributions the emphasis is not confined to labor 
but its is broadened to examine the international mobility of all factors, including capital. 
However, a pessimistic outlook emerges in Jayadev (2007) where high capital mobility 
increases the bargaining strength of firms vis-à-vis workers, adding fresh rents to capital. This 
paper is an important step towards the understanding of  the influence of capital mobility on 
wages and is closer to our approach. On the same topic, a comprehensive theoretical paper had 
already warned, few years earlier, about the distributive implications of the international 
mobility of capital, which is obviously higher than that of labor (Zhao, 1998). As a matter of 
fact FDI appears to reduce the negotiated wage since it shifts the threat point in negotiations 
between trade unions and firms. An opposite view may be found in the joint analysis of 
offshoring and immigration of labor in 58 U.S. manufacturing sectors by Ottaviano, Peri and 
Wright (2010). Over the period 2000-2007, they observe a positive productivity influence of 
immigration and no net effect of offshoring. Notice that offshoring is fairly close to FDI 
outflows on which it is frequently based. A different story is narrated by Geishecker and Görg 
(2011) who maintain that service offshoring negatively affects the real wage of low and medium 
skilled individuals. High skill workers may benefit from service offshoring in terms of better 
real wages. Therefore, the overall result is a widening of the wage gap between expert and less 
expert workers. A similar story emerges from Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch and Xiang (2011) 
                                               
8
 On the rest of trade the exchange rate discipline has been even more severe because the euro appreciated since its 
specie circulation started in January 2002. 
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where offshoring tends to increase the highly specialized  wage and decrease the low skilled 
salary. The novel message of this contribution is that exporting increases the wages of all 
expertise types, while workers displaced from offshoring suffer greater earnings losses than 
other displaced fellows. Eckel and Egger (2012) maintain that multinational enterprises  use FDI 
to boost their threat option in bargaining over wages with trade unions, and exert a downward 
pressure on salaries. Trade unions could improve upon their standing by cooperating 
internationally. Yet this would be possible only if their preferences as to wages and employment 
converged across countries. Quite a remote scenario. 
 
The aim of the paper 
 
We would like to add our contribution to the above surveyed literature, by assessing the joint 
effect of migration and capital movements on aggregate wages. We shall assume that wages are 
determined in a representative bargaining framework where migration flows change the outside 
option of employed workers and FDI outflows shift and improve the outside option of firms. 
Entrepreneurs hold a kind of threat option to delocalize their productive units in a foreign 
country and to dismiss the domestically employed workers.  The representative individual 
bargaining takes place between union delegates and the firm’s CEO. The outside option of the 
firm is given by the returns obtainable from delocalizing production abroad, mostly through 
FDI. Workers delegates during negotiation have to take into account the possibility of 
unemployment. In that case the most likely and immediate alternative salary employees may get 
is that offered by the informal sector, where the wage is highly affected by immigration flows. 
Indeed new migrants crowd this sector more than any other place. In this framework we jointly 
analyze the effects of migration inflows  and FDI outflows on the bargained wage. By adopting 
this approach we differentiate our contribution from existing literature and provide a novel 
assessment of the relationship between international factor mobility and wage determination. 
The empirical part of our analysis is conducted on quarterly data over the period 1996-2007 for 
a panel of 13 European countries for which comparable data on migration and FDI outflows are 
available9. Our main results point out that FDI outflows have a significant  and robust negative 
influence on the aggregate real wage. The effects  of migration inflows, on the other hand, are 
not so clear-cut, as the estimated coefficient is null  or negative depending on the set of 
countries considered. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the 
theoretical model of bargaining which will be the reference point for the derivation of the 
aggregate wage equation.  In section 3 we go through the estimation of the wage equation. In 
section 4 we draw the conclusions of our investigation. 
 
2.  The theoretical framework 
 
 
The theoretical approach we adopt is one of partial equilibrium based on an individual bargaining 
between workers’ and firms’ representatives.  
We begin by assuming that aggregate production (Y) is based on labor (L) and  raw materials (R), 
linked by a Cobb Douglas technical relation10: 
 
Y =  Lα R 1- α     (1) 
 
                                               
9From Eurostat and OECD source.  
10We ignore capital for the sake of simplicity. Interpreted strictly, then, Y  should be final output net of capital 
compensation. 
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Labor consists of two components, native (LN) and immigrant (LM) workers, which, following 
Borjas (2003, 2009), we assume are perfect substitutes11 in production (L = LN + LM).   
 
The aggregate profit function, in real terms, is given by: 
 
Π = Y – w L– vR    (2) 
 
where w is the real wage and v is the (real) price of raw materials. 
We envisage a scenario where the real wage is not determined in a supply-demand framework but, 
due to market imperfections on both sides, via a bargaining procedure between workers’ and firms’ 
delegates. Specifically, we consider a Nash bargaining solution in which many identical firms and 
workers’ representatives  set real wages so as to maximize the following joint utility or bargaining 
function: 
 
Ω = [V  - V°]µ  [Π - Π °] 1- µ  (3)  
 
where  V and Π  are the unions’ and firms’ objectives respectively, while  V° and Π ° are the outside 
options that the two parties face if the bargaining falls apart.  
 
We assume that the workers’ objective is simply given by the average real wage 
 
V = w         (4) 
    
As for workers’ outside option, we assume that it is either the real wage that they can earn by 
getting employed in some other firm, w’, or the alternative income, w0, they may get in case they 
become unemployed and work irregularly in the informal sector (moonlighting). If the probability 
of becoming unemployed is a positive function ( f)  of the total unemployment rate, (u), then 
worker’s outside option can be expressed as: 
 
V0 = (1-f(u))w’ + f(u)w0    (5) 
 
Real income in case of unemployment, w0, is a fraction of the real wage which depends on the 
“moonlight” wage  that unemployed workers can earn  from off-the-book employment12.  
We assume that the“moonlight” wage is a negative function  of migration inflows, which in turn 
may be captured by the ratio between the unemployment rate of foreigners and the total 
unemployment rate. Since new migrants tend to be unemployed for a while when they arrive,  an 
immigration flow should be mirrored by a rise of the ratio between migrant and total  
unemployment rates, and a drop of the moonlight wage. This assumption is consistent with the large 
portion of literature on immigration, seen in the introduction,  that endorses the perfect 
substitutability between new and  incumbent migrants.  
 
The expression for w0 is then: 
 

   

  	
			  0    (6) 
 
                                               
11
 The rational for this assumption lies in the diffusion  in many countries especially in Europe of national contracts  
whereby no discrimination  in terms of jobs and wages can be made between native and foreign workers. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the effects of migration feed back mostly in the informal sector wages. 
12
 We ignore unemployment benefits for the sake of simplicity. These could easily be introduced  (they are a constant 
fraction of the wage), without altering the analysis. See, for instance, Podrecca (2011). 
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where uf  is the unemployment rate for migrants. 
 
The outside option for firms takes into account the possible transfer of production facilities in a 
lower wage country via FDI. As emphasized in the introduction a bunch of papers point out that this 
opportunity is going to affect wage bargaining in a way which is unfavorable to workers. For this 
reason we assume that: 
 
Π °=  g(FDI) with g’>0.    (7) 
 
In other words, firms are assumed to be able to obtain a return from relocating production abroad  in 
case the bargaining is not successful. Such a return is assumed to be a positive function of the 
amount of direct investment the firms carry out abroad. 
 
The joint maximization of Ω (eq. 3) with respect to w implies that the real wage must satisfy the 
following first order condition (FOC): 
 
 
			°
 

       (8) 
 
 
By maximizing Ω individual bargainers take w’ as given and behave as if the outcome of their 
bargaining had no effect on the wage paid elsewhere in the economy13.  However,  an affine 
bargaining is taking place between all firms and workers’ representatives in the economy. 
Therefore,  the real wage is eventually going to be the same across all bargaining units. 
On the basis of these arguments we may  maintain that  w’=w, so that:  
 
    
  
  
 1     
 1   

         .     (9) 
 
From equations (2) and (7) one gets: 
 
Π - Π ° =  Y – w L  – vR – g(FDI).    (10) 
 
Substituting (9) and (10) into the first order condition (8) we get: 
 
 
!"	#
 
 
$	%&'
 

 
 (1   

 ), (11) 
 
and finally: 

  !"	# 
$	%&'
  (1 +

  1   

  )

, (12) 
 
which suggests that, in equilibrium, the real wage is affected by four fundamental variables: value 
added per worker14 or labor productivity,  the total unemployment rate, the ratio between migrant 
and total unemployment rates and firms’ outside option to relocate abroad via FDI. 
                                               
13This sort of conjecture is similar to the one adopted in Lucas (1973). 
14
 Which is gross output minus the cost of raw materials  (in real terms), Y - v R. Since we are ignoring capital this 
should be, strictly speaking, value added net of capital compensation .  
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A log-linearized version of (12) can be taken to be our “core” wage equation, valid as a long-run 
equilibrium relationship: 
 
 
log
 	/ + / log 01   /2log	 /3 log 

   /4 log 
$	%&'
 			  .       (12’) 
 
 
 
3.Estimation of the wage setting parameters 
 
 
The level wage equation (12’) is relevant when one thinks of long run (equilibrium) behavior. In 
what follows we will use an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to model the short 
run dynamics of real wage adjustment, and we will estimate it and derive the associated long run 
parameters in a panel data framework.  
Given data on time periods t=1, 2, ..., T and countries i=1, 2, ..., N, we think of the short run 
dynamic specification of the wage equation as an ARDL(p, q,…, q) model, which can be 
reparametrized in  Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) form as: 
∆678
9:  ;9678
9,: + <9678=9,: +>?9@∆678
9,:@
A
@B
+>C9@ ∆678=9,:@ + D9 + E9:
F
@B
13 
	
																								  1. . I; 		  1. . K	
 
 
where xit is the 4x1 vector of the explanatory variables in the core wage equation (12’), bi and dij are 
4x1 vectors of coefficients, Φi and cij are scalar coefficients and µi is a fixed effect15. Time trends 
and seasonal dummies could be included but we omit them in the text for notational convenience. 
We will however introduce them in the empirical estimates. 
The error terms, εit, are assumed to be identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
and independent across time and groups. 
Notice that equation (13) is identified if lagged levels of w do not enter the determination of the 
∆x’s.16 Given (13),  the parameters of the long run level relation between log w and the log x’s (i.e., 
coefficients a1, a2, a3 and a4 in (12’) can be derived as: ai =[a1i, a2i, a3i, a4i] =  −(bi/Φi)17. 
 
We will perform estimations on quarterly data over the period 1996_q1 − 2007_q4 for a group of 13 
European countries.18 Data for the real wage, real value added per worker,  total and migrant  
unemployment  rates are  from Eurostat source19; FDI data are from OECD source, and we use 
outward FDI as a share of GDP as a proxy for g(FDI)/L. The group size is limited by the 
availability of homogeneous data on  migrant employment and unemployment over a  time span  
                                               
15
 We model the real wage wt conditionally to the realizations of the explanatory variables in xt  and given past values of 
wt and xt. 
16This hypothesis in words means that past values of  the wage level do not affect current changes of the explanatory 
variables (i.e. of unemployment, productivity, migration flows, and FDI). Notice that the hypothesis does not exclude 
that lagged changes of w enter the determination of  ∆x’s. 
17
 The identifying condition for the short run wage equation (i.e. that past values of w do not enter the determination of 
the ∆x’s) also implies that there is only one conditional long run level relationship between wt and the conditioning 
variables. 
18
 The list of countries is: BE, DK, GE, GR, ES, FR, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK, NO.  
19As a measure of the average wage, an index of average monthly earnings is used.  
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long enough to allow meaningful estimations.20 The panel includes 13 countries and, where 
possible, 48 quarterly observations per country. However, the panel is unbalanced since in 4 
countries the time span is shortened due to missing data on migration variables in earlier years.21 
 
Before proceeding with the estimation, we check for unit roots  in each series, using the Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003) test for heterogeneous panels (IPS).  The results of the test are shown in Table 1. 
As one can see  the unit root hypothesis is always accepted: there is clear evidence of non 
stationarity for all of the variables series.22 We then test for cointegration, using the Kao (1999)  and 
the Pedroni (1999, 2004)    Engel Granger based  panel cointegration tests.  As one can see in Table 
2, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected  both by the Kao test  and by the Pedroni’s 
Panel PP, Panel ADF, Group PP and Group ADF statistics.23 Having assessed cointegration, we 
now turn to the estimation of the short run dynamics of wage adjustment and the derivation of the 
associated long run parameters.  
 
To estimate the model on panel data, we apply the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed 
by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). Contrary to traditional pooling approaches like Dynamic Fixed 
Effects, the PMG estimator allows not only the intercepts (D9, but also the short run coefficients (bi 
and dij) and  the error variances in equation (13) to differ freely across groups, while constraining 
the long run coefficients to be the same across groups (ai = a). Since it does not impose 
homogeneity of short run slope coefficients, the PMG estimator also allows the lag structures in the 
dynamic specification to be different across countries. The estimator is efficient and consistent 
provided homogeneity of long run parameters holds (Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)). 
We estimate the model including  time trends and quarterly dummies, and allowing the lag structure 
to differ across countries in the short run dynamic specification. In particular, the preferred 
(parsimonious) ARDL specification is selected for each country using the Schwartz information 
criterion. 
The results of the PMG estimates of the long run parameters are reported in Table 3, which also 
reports the Hausman tests for homogeneity of long run coefficients. These tests are applied to the 
differences between the PMG estimates  and the Mean Group estimates (i.e., the mean of the 
estimates of long run parameters obtained separately on time series data for each individual 
country)24. 
Let us focus first on column a), which reports the estimates for the whole group of 13 countries. A 
glance to the Hausman tests (both for each individual parameter and the joint test) reveals that the 
hypothesis of homogeneity of long run coefficients is not rejected at high levels of significance. 
Looking at the coefficient estimates, notice that the coefficients of total unemployment,  
productivity and the share of outward FDI on GDP are highly significant and their signs are in line 
with theoretical priors. Real productivity has a positive effect on the real wage with an estimated 
                                               
20
 Many countries had to be excluded because data splitting total employment and unemployment between  native and 
migrant workers are not available, or are available for  too short a time span to allow estimation  (for Italy, for example, 
Eurostat data are available only starting in 2005) 
21
 Countries with missing data on migrations are:  NL (migration data start in 98), PT (migration data start in 99), SE 
(migration data start in 97) and NO (migration data start in 2000) 
22We also performed  the CIPS test for panel unit root  proposed by Pesaran (2007), which controls for possible cross 
section dependence. The results (not reported, available from the authors upon request) , confirm the acceptance of the 
unit root hypothesis, and the presence of non stationarity for all of the series.  
23
 We tested many different specifications  besides those reported in table 2 (with and without trend and with different 
lag orders). The cointegration result is always supported. We also performed a cointegration test controlling for possible 
cross section dependence, based on Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects estimates and on the CIPS test for panel 
unit root on the residuals of such estimates. In this case the unit root hypothesis on the residuals is rejected (thus 
confirming cointegration) only for a specification of  lags of 2 or less; the hypothesis is accepted for higher order lags 
specifications.   
24
 See Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) 
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elasticity close to unity, as one expects. The total unemployment rate has a negative influence on 
the wage with an estimated elasticity of -0.110, a  magnitude which is in line with previous results 
in the cross country literature25. The share of outward FDI on GDP has a negative effect on the real 
wage, with a 1% increase in the share of outward FDI over GDP decreasing the log real wage by 
0.026%.26  
As to the wage effect of the immigration flows  (as proxied by the ratio between migrant and total 
unemployment rates), although it has the expected negative sign, it is not significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels: migrations inflows do not seem to have any significant effect on 
the aggregate average real wage. 
The group specific diagnostic statistics for the short run equations of individual countries are 
reported in Table 4 panel (a), which also reports the country specific estimates of the autoregressive 
parameters.  The overall performance is satisfactory, given that  in the present context we are not 
able to take into account the particular features of each single country, and that our standard 
estimates cannot but sketch a first broad-brush picture.  A very high percentage of the change in the 
log real wage is explained in almost all countries27; the standard error of the regression varies from 
0.3% to 6%28; at the 5% level of significance there is evidence of residual autocorrelation in one 
country29, of functional form misspecification in one30 and of non-normal errors in one31 while there 
is no evidence of heteroskedasticity in any of the countries.  
In column b) of Table 3, we drop from the sample the 4 countries for which observations on 
migration flows are missing in the earlier years32, and  repeat the estimates on a restricted balanced 
panel of 9 countries, with  the complete series of 48 time observations per country.  In the restricted 
sample, the coefficients of unemployment, productivity and outward FDI remain highly significant 
and with the expected sign, and their estimated magnitude is quite stable with respect to the 
estimates of column a); on the other hand the result on the wage effects of migration inflows 
changes: the coefficient of the ratio between migrant and total unemployment rates is now negative 
and highly significant,  with an estimated elasticity of -0.15.  
The hypothesis of long run coefficient homogeneity is accepted by the individual Hausman tests, 
and the diagnostic statistics in the bottom panel of table 4 are quite satisfactory, as 8 of the 9 
country specific equations show no evident sign of misspecification. 
Although the ARDL specification used should mitigate the problem, the coefficient estimates in 
columns a) and b) of Table 3 could be affected by the potential endogeneity of  outward FDI, 
immigration flows, and unemployment33.  Notice however that the causal effects from outward FDI 
to wages and viceversa work in opposite directions34, and the same is true for immigration flows 
and for the total unemployment rate35. Therefore we expect that endogeneity bias, if present, would 
                                               
25
 Where the elasticity of the real wage to unemployment varies from around -10%  (e.g. in Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1990,1994) and Podrecca (2011))  to -5% (in Nunziata (2005)). 
26
 Since -0.026 = dlogw/dO_FDI, the reaction of the real wage to changes in O_FDI is:  dw/dO_FDI = -0.026 w.  
Given the range of wage indexes in our sample, the reaction of wages to a doubling of O_FDI is in the range of 2%-3%. 
27
 With the exception of Norway,  UK and Finland, where the adjusted R-squared drops to 27%, 44% and 3% 
respectively. 
28In Sweden and the UK respectively. 
29
 The UK.  
30
 Norway 
31
 Greece 
32The countries dropped are NL, PT, SE and NO. Missing observations on migration in the earlier years considerably 
lower the time span of the series for these countries, since in the estimation procedure observations on all explanatory 
variables are dropped in time periods with missing data for one of them . 
33
 As a matter of fact, productivity could be endogenous as well, if  one thinks of efficiency wage theories. 
34
 The causal effect from outward FDI to wages is negative, while the reverse causal effect from wages to outward FDI 
is positive, with higher wages triggering higher outward FDI. 
35
 Both immigration flows and the total unemployment rate negatively affect wages, while the reverse causal effects 
from wages to immigration flows and from wages to unemployment are both positive.   
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lower the magnitudes of the estimated effects of outward FDI, immigration flows and 
unemployment, i.e. would make them less negative. 36   
Overall, the results strongly support our  model’s theoretical predictions on the negative effects of 
outward FDI on wages, and there is some evidence in favour of the predicted negative effect of 
migration inflows as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we tried to assess the joint effect of migration and capital movements on aggregate 
wages. We presented a theoretical model where wages are determined in a representative bargaining 
framework in which migration inflows and FDI outflows change the outside option of employed 
workers and firms respectively.  Specifically, workers have to consider the possibility of being 
unemployed and the fact that the alternative salary they may get in case of dismissal is the one 
available in the informal sector, where the wage is highly affected by immigration flows since new 
migrants crowd this sector more than any other section of the labor market. Migration inflows tend 
to lower the informal sector wage, and the lower value of the outside option for workers tends to 
translate in a lower bargained wage. The outside option for firms is given by the profits obtainable 
from delocalizing production abroad, mostly through FDI. FDI outflows shift and improve the 
outside option of firms mimicking a kind of threat of entrepreneurs to delocalize their productive 
units in a foreign country and dismissing the domestically employed workers. This in turn translates 
in a lower bargained wage. In this framework, we derived an aggregate wage equation where the 
level of the real wage is a function of  the unemployment rate, productivity, migration inflows and 
outward FDI’s.  The parameters of the wage equation were estimated on quarterly data for a group 
of 13 European countries over the period 1996-2007 by applying the Pooled Mean Group maximum 
likelihood estimator. 
The results strongly confirm the theoretical predictions on the effects of FDI outflows, which  have 
a significant and robust negative effect on the aggregate real wage. The influence   of migration 
inflows, on the other hand, are not so clear-cut: the estimated effect may be null  or negative 
depending on the set of countries considered. 
 
                                               
36
 The coefficient on productivity, on the other hand, would be biased upwards if endogeneity was present, since the 
causal effect of productivity on wages are both positive. 
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Table 1.  Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
 
Series* IPS W statistic** P-value 
log (w) 3.0380 0.9988 
log (U) -0.03173 0.4873 
log(VA/L) 1.75244 0.9602 
log(UM/U) 0.42342 0.3360 
FDI/GDP -0.81932 0.2063 
   
 *w: real wage; U: unemployment rate; VA/L: real value added  per employed worker; UM :  
      unemployment rate of migrants. FDI/GDP : share of outward FDI on GDP.  
   **Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003).  
    Lag length selection based on SIC. Individual effects included. 13 cross sections. No trend  included.  
 
 
Table 2. Cointegration tests 
 
(i) Kao Residual Cointegration Test 
Series: log(w), log(U), log(VA/L), log(UM/U), FDI/GDP  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
     
     
   t-Statistic P-value 
ADF    4.869504  0.0000 
     
     Residual variance  0.010368  
HAC variance   0.002786  
     
     No deterministic trend included.   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC 
 
(ii) Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test   
Series: log(w), log(U), log(VA/L), log(UM/U), FDI/GDP   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic P-value Statistic P-value. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.825612  0.2045  1.077848  0.1406 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.996315  0.9986  2.813071  0.9975 
Panel PP-Statistic -43.63414  0.0000 -52.69117  0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -23.15424  0.0000 -11.13527  0.0000 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic P-value   
Group rho-Statistic  4.628643  1.0000   
Group PP-Statistic -46.75686  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.997096  0.0014   
      
      No deterministic trend included.   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC 
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Table 3 
 
Pooled Mean GroupMaximum Likelihood Estimates of the Long Run Coefficients 
and tests for homogeneity of long run parameters 
 
 (a) 13 countries* (b) 9 countries** 
  H test  H test 
log(U) 
 
-0.110 
(-8.66) 
0.00 
[0.96] 
-0.126 
(-5.70) 
1.28 
[0.26] 
log(VA/L) 
 
1.010    
(13.20) 
0.01 
[0.93] 
1.125 
(11.99) 
0.27 
[0.60] 
log(UM/U) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.73) 
0.20 
[0.65] 
-0.150 
(-5.53) 
0.01 
[0.93] 
O_FDI -0.026 
(-2.93) 
0.28 
[0.60] 
-0.038 
(-3.33) 
2.88 
[0.09] 
     
Joint H Test 0.72   [0.95] n.a. 
 
Dependent variable: log(w) 
w: real wage; U: unemployment rate; VA/L: real value added  per employed worker; UM :  
unemployment rate of migrants. O_FDI : share of outward FDI on GDP.  
t-ratios in parenthesis,  p values in square brackets. 
H test = Hausman test for homogeneous long run parameters, applied to difference between Mean 
Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimates). 
*BE, DK, GE, GR, ES, FR, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK, NO. 
**BE, DK, GE, GR, ES, FR, AT, FI, UK.  
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Table 4 
Group-specific diagnostic statistics and estimates of the group-specific autoregressive coefficient 
Φi 
(a) – 13 countries 
 SER AR(χ21) χ21-FF χ22-NOR χ22-HET Adj. R2 LL Φi 
BE 0.015 18.23 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.98 134.00 -1.0000 
DK 0.006 10.14 2.60 0.81 2.55 0.99 177.33 -0.0327 
GE 0.010 9.41 17.85 0.34 8.09 0.99 157.26 -0.0435 
GR 0.036 5.89 13.49 91.19 7.13 0.95 92.95 -0.1687 
ES 0.018 8.45 4.59 0.85 11.54 0.94 128.71 -0.0132 
FR 0.010 7.98 2.01 6.40 1.38 0.97 156.54 0.0003 
NL 0.018 10.83 5.69 1.01 1.22 0.99 92.46 -0.0382 
AT 0.011 2.72 3.47 4.61 0.01 1.00 153.62 -0.2507 
PT 0.029 25.57 0.00 2.09 0.17 0.96 77.73 -1.0000 
FI 0.014 3.76 1.53 1.25 0.27 0.03 139.05 -0.0104 
SE 0.003 2.20 3.08 2.99 2.12 0.87 184.21 -0.0204 
UK 0.060 173.34 1.02 1.39 0.99 0.27 71.09 -1.0000 
NO 0.007 2.58 29.26 0.79 1.40 0.44 68.94 -0.4904 
SER: Standard Error of the regression. AR(χ21): LM test for first and second order autocorrelation of 
residuals.   χ21-FF: Reset test for functional form.  χ22-NOR: test for normality of residuals. χ22-HET: 
test for heteroskedasticity.  Adj. R2: adjusted R2. LL: log likelihood. 
 
(b) – 9 countries 
 SER AR(χ21) χ21-FF χ22-NOR χ22-HET Adj. R2 LL Φi 
BE 0.017 28.47 0.53 0.66 2.80 0.97 127.83 -1.0000 
DK 0.006 9.04 2.68 0.83 2.54 0.99 177.03 -0.0222 
GE 0.009 6.48 5.79 0.26 7.20 0.99 158.01 -0.0699 
GR 0.035 4.39 0.86 80.19 5.24 0.95 94.84 -0.3316 
ES 0.018 8.38 4.88 0.88 12.44 0.94 128.97 -0.0193 
FR 0.010 6.64 2.51 10.46 0.85 0.97 156.79 -0.0190 
AT 0.011 3.27 0.53 3.02 1.07 1.00 153.48 -0.1515 
FI 0.014 4.03 0.05 0.72 0.09 0.04 139.38 0.0035 
UK 0.047 26.94 0.23 3.01 6.68 0.55 82.39 -1.0000 
SER: Standard Error of the regression. AR(χ21): LM test for first and second order autocorrelation of 
residuals.   χ21-FF: Reset test for functional form.  χ22-NOR: test for normality of residuals. χ22-HET: 
test for heteroskedasticity. Adj. R2: adjusted R2. LL: log likelihood. 
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